ANAMBRA VS BORNO: COMPARING PETER OBI AND KASHIM SHETTIMA WITH HISTORICAL FACTS AND PERFORMANCE DATA, NOT MISLEADING STATISTICS
By Otunba (Dr) Abdulfalil Abayomi Odunowo
The figures circulating in public debate raise legitimate questions about governance, poverty and human development in Nigeria. To assess former Governor Peter Obi of Anambra State and former Governor Kashim Shettima of Borno State fairly, we must examine their actual records during their respective tenures, using verifiable historical context and measurable outcomes rather than post-tenure snapshots or selective statistics.
Historical timelines and overlapping periods
Peter Obi governed Anambra from March 2006 to March 2014 (with interruptions due to legal and political disputes). Kashim Shettima governed Borno from May 2011 to May 2019. Their tenures overlapped for less than three years (May 2011–March 2014). Any direct comparison must account for this limited overlap and the radically different conditions each inherited and faced.
Poverty statistics in proper context
Widely circulated figures such as 14% poverty in Anambra versus 73% in Borno cannot be treated as end-of-tenure scorecards for either governor. The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) 2022 Multidimensional Poverty Index (data largely from 2021–2022) reported Anambra at 32.1% multidimensionally poor and Borno at 72.5%. These were collected roughly eight years after Obi left office and more than two years after Shettima left office.
Earlier NBS monetary poverty data show: Anambra 41.4% (2003–04, pre-Obi/early tenure), rising to 53.7% (2009–10, during tenure), then falling to 14.8% by 2019. Borno recorded 53.6% (2004) and 61.1% (2010). The 2018–19 NBS Living Standards Survey (excluding Borno due to insecurity) put national poverty at 40.1%, with Anambra among the lowest at 14.8%. Direct year-to-year comparisons across different survey methodologies are imperfect, and post-tenure figures reflect subsequent administrations, national trends, private-sector activity and (in Borno’s case) prolonged conflict recovery.
Structural and security differences
Anambra entered Obi’s tenure with a long-established commercial economy, dense trading networks, strong private-sector entrepreneurship and relatively higher baseline human-capital indicators. Borno became the epicentre of the Boko Haram insurgency, which intensified before and throughout Shettima’s administration. World Bank post-insurgency assessments documented catastrophic damage in Borno: approximately $5.9 billion in infrastructure losses; destruction or damage to 956,000 private houses (about 30% of the housing stock); 5,335 classrooms and school buildings across 512 primary schools, 38 secondary schools and two tertiary institutions; 201 health centres; 1,630 water sources; 726 power installations; and hundreds of municipal buildings. Tens of thousands were orphaned (over 52,000) or widowed (over 54,000), with massive displacement. These conditions severely constrained economic activity, education, healthcare access and revenue generation in ways Anambra did not experience.
Acknowledging these differences does not excuse shortcomings in either state; it simply prevents unfair attribution of outcomes solely to individual governors.
Documented performance under Peter Obi (Anambra, 2006–2014)
Obi’s administration emphasised fiscal prudence, education partnership and healthcare infrastructure:
* Education: Returned 1,040 primary schools (and earlier secondary schools) to mission/voluntary agency ownership in 2009 with ongoing funding support (reported ~₦6 billion initial grants). Anambra rose from roughly 24th–26th position nationally to 1st in NECO and WAEC/WASSCE results for three consecutive years (around 2011–2013). Investments included hundreds of classroom blocks, buses for secondary schools (reports of 700+), computers (tens of thousands), internet connectivity in hundreds of schools, and incentives for first-class graduates. World Bank-linked studies later examined the mission-partnership model.
* Health: Built the Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu University Teaching Hospital in Awka from scratch. Supported mission hospitals (e.g., Iyienu, Lourdes, Borromeo, Holy Rosary, St Joseph) with significant funding. By 2014, more than a dozen health institutions had secured accreditation (none at the start of the tenure). Received Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation recognition (with complementary state funding) for immunisation performance in the South-East; used proceeds toward maternal and child centres.
* Fiscal and infrastructure: Rated among the least-indebted states by the Debt Management Office during the period. Left substantial liquid investments (Obi and supporting accounts cite $150–156 million in dollar-denominated holdings/bonds plus other savings; total claimed equivalent investments around $500 million in various forms). External debt stock rose modestly from ~$18 million inherited to ~$30 million by end-2013/early 2014 according to DMO figures (later controversies concern World Bank project facilities signed during the tenure whose drawdowns and outstanding balances continued afterward). Road works included hundreds of kilometres of asphalt and notable urban corridors. Anambra Integrated Development Strategy (ANIDS) guided multi-sector prioritisation.
These outcomes occurred against a commercial baseline and without the scale of violent disruption faced in Borno.
Documented performance under Kashim Shettima (Borno, 2011–2019)
Shettima governed amid active insurgency that destroyed large parts of the state’s physical and social infrastructure. Key efforts focused on security support, reconstruction, education for orphans and basic service restoration:
* Education and orphans: Constructed or advanced 40–44 “mega” primary schools (many with boarding) targeted at insurgency orphans and displaced children; reported capacity aimed at tens of thousands. Built or renovated thousands of classrooms (one account cites 1,711 classrooms across 256 primary/junior secondary schools), established new secondary schools, and renovated many existing ones. Supported Safe Schools Initiative. Buses and other logistics were provided in safer areas. Enrolment and functionality remained severely constrained while large territories were insecure.
* Health: Increased medical doctors from 62–65 to 129–152; nurses/midwives from 980 to ~1,850. Built or overhauled multiple general hospitals, diagnostic centres and kidney dialysis facilities; acquired ambulances, mobile clinics and scanning equipment. Sent groups of students (including girls) for medical training abroad (e.g., Sudan).
* Reconstruction and livelihoods: Created a Ministry of Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Resettlement. Rebuilt more than 30,000 homes in recovered towns (Bama, Gwoza, etc.). Supported Civilian Joint Task Force (funding, logistics). Advanced an industrial park with manufacturing plants. Agricultural interventions included tractors, harvesters, seedlings, fertiliser subsidies and rice/oil mills aimed at restoring livelihoods. Road and urban works continued in secured areas (Maiduguri and environs).
These measures occurred while large parts of the state remained under threat or newly recovered; many outcomes were therefore partial and security-dependent.
Human Development Index (HDI) interpretation
Subnational HDI (Global Data Lab and related series) measures long-term outcomes in health, education and income. Anambra has consistently ranked among Nigeria’s higher performers (e.g., 0.60 in 2010 rising toward 0.67–0.70 by the early 2020s). Borno ranked lower (e.g., 0.36–0.42 range in earlier years, later recovering toward 0.46–0.47), reflecting decades of investment differentials plus the catastrophic interruption of the insurgency. HDI is not a pure “governor scorecard”; it accumulates household, private-sector and multi-administration effects. It cannot by itself rank the two governors.
The right questions for evidence-based assessment
* What were poverty, enrolment, health-access and infrastructure indicators at the start versus end of each tenure (using comparable methodologies where possible)?
* How efficiently were available revenues and federal transfers utilised relative to the challenges faced?
* What measurable, attributable improvements in education quality, healthcare accreditation/access, fiscal buffers and physical infrastructure occurred under each administration?
* How did the intensity and geography of insecurity in Borno constrain or reshape possible outcomes?
Conclusion
Peter Obi’s record in Anambra shows clear gains in examination performance, school mission partnerships, healthcare accreditation and fiscal buffers under relatively favourable structural conditions. Kashim Shettima’s record in Borno shows sustained efforts at reconstruction, orphan education, health-worker expansion and livelihood support under extreme security and destruction constraints that no southern state faced on comparable scale. A poverty or HDI figure recorded years after both left office cannot, by itself, declare one administration superior.
Nigeria needs a political culture that privileges comparable historical data, context-specific constraints and measurable public outcomes over selective statistics and partisan loyalty. Leaders should be judged by evidence of what they achieved with the resources and conditions they actually faced.
By Otunba (Dr.) Abdulfalil Abayomi Odunowo National Chairman, AATSG
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