THE LAGOS–CALABAR COASTAL HIGHWAY: WHY ENGINEERING JUDGMENT MUST OUTWEIGH POLITICAL SENTIMENT
PART TWO: Why the Revised Alignment, East–West Road Integration, and the Economics of Connectivity Require Objective Examination
By Otunba (Dr.) Abdulfalil Abayomi Odunowo
A country can reach a stage where its biggest barrier to development is not a shortage of money or technical capacity, but a failure to distinguish honest public-interest scrutiny from contrived controversy. The debate over the Lagos–Calabar Coastal Highway presents exactly that challenge.
In Part One, I argued that the coastal highway and the East–West Road should not be treated as competing projects. Each can serve an important national purpose. Recent comments by Works Minister David Umahi introduce a practical consideration: selective integration where engineering conditions, cost, and flood resilience make it sensible. That option should be assessed without ethnic colouring. A highway running from Lagos to Calabar does not belong to the Yoruba, Igbo, Ijaw, or Efik. It should be evaluated on its economic usefulness, engineering integrity, the communities it serves, and the transparency of its execution.
1. A National Corridor, Not a Regional Prize
The Lagos–Calabar Coastal Highway is planned as an approximately 750-kilometre dual carriageway connecting Lagos to coastal economic hubs in Ogun, Ondo, Edo, Delta, Bayelsa, Rivers, Akwa Ibom, and Cross River. Its purpose is to strengthen links among ports, including Lekki Deep Sea Port, the Dangote Refinery complex, industrial clusters, agricultural areas, and fishing communities. These states contain a large share of Nigeria’s maritime, petroleum, gas, and manufacturing activity. The economic case is straightforward. The unresolved question is whether the revised design can produce those gains at a cost that remains sustainable. A project does not become sound simply because the government labels it strategic, just as it does not become worthless because critics challenge the administration carrying it out.
2. The Revised Alignment: An Engineering Decision, Not Whim
Umahi has said that challenging terrain, especially deep pits of more than 100 metres and unsuitable sharp sand extending to depths of up to 300 meters, forced a redesign of some sections, including a detour on the Ondo axis (Sections 4A and 4B, roughly 67 km). President Tinubu directed that from the end of Ondo into Edo, the highway should make use of the existing East–West corridor instead of insisting on a wholly new route through swamp terrain. The Ondo–Edo segment is estimated at about 104 km and includes a proposed 45 km Benin bypass aimed at easing through-traffic congestion in the city.
Road construction is not a simple matter of drawing straight lines. Engineers have to consider soil-bearing capacity, groundwater conditions, flooding, settlement risk, environmental effects, upfront cost, and long-term maintenance. When a fresh coastal route becomes excessively expensive, improving an existing corridor may be the more rational option, provided the public is shown the comparative geotechnical and economic studies behind that choice. Public acceptance should rest on evidence, not on ministerial declaration alone.
3. Swamp Terrain and the Reality of Cost
The wetlands of southern Nigeria, together with tidal effects and unstable soils, require specialised interventions: deep foundations, ground improvement, elevated stretches, major bridges, and reinforced drainage systems. All of these substantially increase costs. Modern engineering is capable of building in such terrain, but the real issue is whether the expected benefits justify the expense when compared with upgrading an existing route that already connects many of the same economic centres. A less expensive road that avoids the coastal communities and assets the project was designed to reach is not automatically the better answer. By the same token, the most geographically exact alignment is not automatically the most efficient. The real measure is sustainable public benefit for every naira spent.
4. East–West Road: From Competitor to Complement
The East–West Road has long represented a persistent failure. Originally conceived in the 1970s to serve the oil-rich Niger Delta, parts of it were taken over by the Federal Government in the mid-1970s. Dualisation contracts awarded during the Obasanjo administration from 2006 onward have been marked by repeated delays, inadequate funding, flood damage, and incomplete execution. Some portions still sit below current flood levels, and recent collapses and erosion in Delta, Rivers, and Bayelsa have stranded motorists and interrupted commerce. The call for urgent rehabilitation is therefore neither new nor misplaced.
If certain sections can be upgraded by raising them by about two metres above current and projected flood levels, improving drainage and capacity, and constructing strategic bypasses, then some of the coastal highway’s connectivity objectives may also be achieved. At that point, the argument moves away from zero-sum rivalry and toward integrated transport planning for the South. Even so, integration must not become a quiet way of abandoning coastal settlements that are already underserved. The government needs to state plainly which communities will still enjoy direct access and what feeder roads are planned.
5. Flood Resilience Demands More Than Height
Given the repeated flooding in the Niger Delta, elevating vulnerable sections makes sense. But resilience is not created by elevation alone. It also depends on sound hydrological modelling, properly sized culverts and bridges, erosion control, and a clear understanding of how embankments change local flood pathways. A road that remains passable while redirecting water into nearby communities has only shifted the problem. Good infrastructure must protect the transport network and the people living around it.
6. Clarification: The Coastal Highway Has Not Been Cancelled
On 12–13 October 2026, Umahi denied claims that the Federal Government had abandoned the 750 km coastal highway in favour of the East–West Road. According to him, the coastal route remains active and intact, while the reconstruction of about 400 km of the East–West Road is a separate additional intervention. Survey and design activities are still ongoing across Edo, Delta, Bayelsa, and Rivers. Reported progress, based on government figures rather than independent certification, includes the following: Section 1 (≈47.47 km, Lagos) is substantially completed and awaiting commissioning; Section 2 (≈55 km) is targeted for pavement by mid-November 2026; Sections 3A/3B (≈70–75 km, Cross River/Akwa Ibom) are over 40 per cent complete; Sections 4A/4B (Ogun–Ondo) are under construction; and Section 5 (Akwa Ibom) is advancing. Ongoing activity at both the Calabar and Akwa Ibom ends directly contradicts the claim that work is limited to the South-West.
7. Community Concerns Must Not Be Waved Aside
Senior Advocate of Nigeria Ebun-Olu Adegboruwa has rightly pointed to the danger that an inland diversion could leave coastal settlements, especially in Ondo (Ilaje) and Delta, outside the economic corridor they were originally promised. A highway intended to unlock maritime, fishing, and shoreline opportunities should be judged against that purpose. For that reason, transparency about the approved route, the communities affected, and the alternative access arrangements is essential.
8. The Financial Issue Remains Fundamental
The project has attracted scrutiny over cost. Umahi has mentioned a figure of roughly ₦4 billion per kilometre for the concrete pavement design, with Section 1 reported at approximately ₦1.068 trillion for 47.47 km. Overall projections have extended into the multi-trillion-naira range. Any route adjustment or added East–West intervention should therefore come with a consolidated and verifiable account of the original scope versus the revised one, contract variations, financing sources, and total spending to date. If savings are being claimed, they should be stated in measurable terms. Large-scale infrastructure expenditure is not inherently corrupt; when opacity exists, the right response is independent scrutiny, not automatic condemnation. Transparency is a prerequisite for credible development.
9. A Fair Standard for Assessing the Administration
President Tinubu’s administration has placed major road corridors among its priorities. If it delivers a working coastal network together with meaningful rehabilitation of the East–West Road, that would amount to a substantial infrastructure accomplishment. But legacy is determined by completed, durable, and cost-effective assets that produce measurable cuts in travel time and transport costs, not by announcements. Credit should go to what is demonstrably delivered. Public spending should be scrutinised. Unmet promises should attract accountability. That standard should apply to every administration.
My Position and Practical Demands
Nigeria requires both strategic new corridors and proper rehabilitation of the roads it already has. The minister’s clarifications strengthen the case for viewing these projects within a single southern transport framework. Five actions are now necessary:
1. Publish the most recent approved alignment for the entire coastal highway, clearly separated from East–West works.
2. Release independently verifiable progress reports for each section.
3. Disclose the comparative engineering and economic assessments that justified the route changes.
4. Provide a transparent financial breakdown for both projects, including variations and financing.
5. Set measurable performance indicators: journey times, vehicle operating costs, flood resilience, community access, and completion milestones.
These are reasonable expectations for a government spending public resources on behalf of more than 200 million citizens.
Conclusion
The worst outcome would be to reduce a potentially valuable national project to another ethnic contest. The coastal highway is not a Yoruba road simply because construction started in Lagos, and East–West rehabilitation is not a concession to the Niger Delta. Both are funded with national resources and should serve national interests: the fisherman in Bayelsa, the manufacturer in Ogun, the trader in Edo, the transporter in Delta, the industrialist in Rivers, the farmer in Akwa Ibom, and the exporter in Cross River.
Progress in one region does not amount to deprivation in another. Let engineering determine the route, let economics justify the spending, let transparency safeguard public funds, and let completed infrastructure define the legacy. National interest must take precedence over ethnic sentiment. Nigeria deserves no less.
Otunba (Dr.) Abdulfalil Abayomi Odunowo
National President SpeakUp Collective Nigeria
Public Affairs Commentator | Advocate for Accountable Governance and National Development . 18 October 2026
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